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1.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Nature of the Case
This is a professional negligence case brought by Appellant-Plaintiff Bill Gailey against
Respondent-Defendant Kim Whiting, Mr. Gailey's life insurance agent, to recover damages
caused by Mr. Whiting's bad advice. This appeal comes after the District Court dismissed the
Complaint because it believed it lacked personal jurisdiction. It stated two grounds for its
conclusion. The first is that it found the pertinent transactions in this matter the-Mr. Whiting's
sale of the insurance policy in 1994 and his bad advice in 2011-were not part of the same
business transaction. While the first occurred in Idaho, it found that the second occurred in
Hawaii and that Idaho's Long Arm Statute did not authorize Idaho courts to exercise personal
jurisdiction over this matter. Its second ground for dismissing this matter for want of personal
jurisdiction is that it found Mr. Whiting's contacts with Idaho to be too attenuated. It determined
that allowing him to be brought before an Idaho Court on this matter would violate due process.

B. Proceedings Below
In August of 2011, Mr. Whiting gave bad advice to Mr. Gailey which resulted in Mr.
Gailey recognizing $223,323.00 of taxable income upon the receipt of $44,946.70. Because Mr.
Whiting's advice did not disclose that such negative tax consequences would occur and because
Mr. Whiting did not advise Mr. Gailey of options that would permit him to not recognize that
income, Mr. Gailey brought a Complaint for Damages, filed on March 21, 2013, alleging
professional misconduct.
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On May 1, 2013, Mr. Whiting moved to dismiss this case for lack of personal
jurisdiction. On June 11, 2013 Mr. Gailey responded. After hearing arguments on September 6,
2013, the Court entered an Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal
Jurisdiction which granted the motion to dismiss. Final Judgment was entered October 7, 2013.
This appeal followed.
C. Statement of Facts
Mr. Whiting, selling insurance for Western Reserve Life Insurance, entered into a long
term business relationship with Mr. Gailey. (R, Vol. I, p 41 at 8 & 11.) On May 2, 1994, Mr.
Gailey, a resident of Pendleton, Oregon, travelled to Mr. Whiting's office in Boise, Idaho to sign
a contract for the purchase of an insurance policy. (R, Vol. I, pp. 40-41 at 2-6.) Following this
sale of insurance, Mr. Whiting was listed as Western Reserve Life Insurance's agent on each
statement Mr. Whiting received from the company. (R, Vol. I, p. 41 at 7-8 & P 111 at 3.)
Because of this relationship, in 1999 when Mr. Gailey sought information on taking a loan
against his life insurance policy, Mr. Gailey contacted Mr. Whiting for information and
materials. (R, Vol. I, p 112 at 5-6).
Then, in August of 2011, Mr. Gailey sought further advice from Mr. Whiting concerning
his insurance policy. (R, Vol. I, p 41 at 8 & 11.) Mr. Whiting's advice was to surrender the
policy and request to cash out the remaining balance. (R, Vol. I, P 41 at 12.) Mr. Whiting did not
describe the tax consequences of this transaction or recommend alternate strategies to avoid
negative tax consequences. (R, Vol. I, p. 5 at 11-17.) Upon surrendering the life insurance policy,
Mr. Gailey received $44,946.70 from the insurance company but, because of his previous loan,
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had to recognize $223,323.00 of taxable income. (R, Vol. I, p. 5 at 11-17.) Because Mr. Whiting
failed to disclose the tax consequences and failed to discuss other alternatives which would have
allowed Mr. Gailey to avoid recognizing $223,323.00 of income in 2011, he negligently
provided information to Mr. Gailey which he knew or should have known would unnecessarily
cause harm. (R, Vol. I, p. 5 at 11-17.)
At all times during the ongoing business relationship between Mr. Gailey's and Mr.
Whiting, Mr. Gailey believed that Mr. Whiting was a resident of Idaho. (R, Vol. I, p 45-46 at 915.) During this period, Mr. Whiting maintained a business in Boise, Idaho at all timesincluding the entirety of2011. (R, Vol. I, p 45-46 at 9-15.) Additionally, when Mr. Gailey called
or received calls from Mr. Gailey, the calls were always from a phone number with a two-zeroeight area code. (R, Vol. I, P 45-46 at 9-15.) Mr. Gailey also continued receiving statements from
Western Reserve Life Insurance listing Mr. Whiting as its representative and giving Mr. Gailey
an Idaho address. (R, Vol. I, p 45 at 7-8.)
Unbeknownst to Mr. Gailey, Mr. Whiting-after twice being sanctioned by the Idaho
Department of Finance-moved from Idaho to Hawaii. (R, Vol. I, p 46 15 and R, Vol. I, p. 67 at
2). In May of 2011, Mr. Whiting permanently moved to Hawaii, and in June of 2011, Mr.
Whiting relinquished his Idaho Insurance license. (R, Vol. I, p 67 at 3-6.) Despite these events
occurring, when Mr. Gailey spoke with Mr. Whiting, Mr. Whiting never disclosed he had left the
state or that he had relinquished his license. It was while Mr. Whiting was in Hawaii that he
provided Mr. Gailey with the bad advice that is the subject of this litigation.
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II.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1. Did the trial court err in ruling that the business relationship between Mr. Gailey and Mr.
Whiting was comprised of separate discrete events?
2. Did the trial court err in ruling that Idaho's Long Arm Statute did not authorize Idaho's
courts to exercise its jurisdiction over Mr. Whiting?
3. Did the trial court err in ruling that subjecting Mr. Whiting to the jurisdiction ofthe Idaho
Courts would violate principles of due process?

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The question of the existence of personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant is
one oflaw which we review freely. Beco Corp. v. Roberts & Sons Canst. Co., 114 Idaho 704,
706-08 (1988). In reviewing a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction in which the
evidence is presented through affidavits to the court, if there is a dispute over the facts, the court
should apply an evidentiary presumption in favor of the non-moving party. Intermountain

Business Forms, Inc v. Shepherd Business Forms Co., 96 Idaho 538, 531 (1975). It is the same
standard that this Court applies when reviewing evidence in a motion for summary judgment:
review the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Houghland Farms, Inc. v.

Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 75 (1990).
IV.

Argument

A. By Selling Insurance in Idaho and Maintaining a Long Term Business Relationship
with Mr. Gailey, Mr. Whiting has Availed Himself of Idaho's Long Arm Statute.
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Idaho's Long Ann Statute--the statute that authorizes Idaho Courts to exerCIse its
jurisdiction over non-resident defendants-states that anyone transacting business within the
state ofIdaho is subject to its jurisdiction. I.C. 5-514 (a) (2010). The statute reads:
The transaction of any business within this state which is hereby defined as the
doing of any act for the purpose of realizing pecuniary benefit or accomplishing
or attempting to accomplish, transact or enhance the business purpose or objective
or any part thereof of such person, firm, company, association or corporation;
Id. An Idaho Court's power to exercise this jurisdiction is not restricted by when the business is

transacted, or between which parties. The statute is express: any defendant who engages in
business in the state of Idaho is subject to its long arm statute.
Here, Mr. Whiting's ongoing business relationship with Mr. Gailey-almost all of it
being conducted in Idaho-is sufficient for Idaho's Court's to exercise its long arm jurisdiction.
In 1994, Mr. Whiting, with the goal of recognizing pecuniary gain in the state of Idaho, sold an
insurance contract to Mr. Gailey. Between the execution of the insurance contract in Mr.
Whiting's Boise, Idaho office until the time he left the state in May 2011, Mr. Whiting earned
money as an insurance agent for Western Reserve Life Insurance by being its representative in
Boise. Part of the responsibilities of this position was to be available for customer questions and
concerns and to be listed as the company's representative on materials sent to clients. Mr. Gailey,
a recipient of these materials, sought Mr. Whiting's help with decisions regarding his insurance
policy in 1999 and 2011. Almost all of the professional service Mr. Gailey received from Mr.
Whiting occurred while Mr. Whiting was in Boise, and all of the work Mr. Whiting performed
for Mr. Gailey was for the purpose of realizing some pecuniary benefit.
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Furthennore, there is neither statute nor case law that states that just because the initial
contract was signed seventeen years prior that this age somehow limits the Court's exercise of its
long-ann jurisdiction. If this were the case, the application of Idaho Code section 5-514 would
upend the rights of many Idaho citizens who seek relief after having their interests damaged
while conducting business under a long tenn contract. Such a policy would operate as a
common-law and ill-defined statute of limitation.
Additionally, not only did Mr. Whiting directly transact business with Mr. Gailey
between 1994 and May of2011, Mr. Whiting carried on his business after moving to Hawaii as
if he were still in Idaho. By continuing to operate a business in Idaho from Hawaii and by
continuing to service his clients from his Idaho practice, Mr. Whiting continued to transact
business in Idaho. Mr. Whiting was publicly listed as operating from his Boise office and
Western Reserve Life Insurance still listed his Boise office as his location. Mr. Whiting received
and placed phone calls on a two-zero-eight phone number. To any of Mr. Whiting's customers,
including Mr. Gailey, he appeared to be working from Idaho.
In August of 2011, even though Mr. Whiting physically conducted his business while he
was in Hawaii, his business was still centered in Idaho. When Mr. Gailey called to seek advice
from Mr. Whiting, Mr. Gailey fully believed that he was speaking with and working with an
Idaho based insurance representative.
Mr. Whiting's actions of selling and servicing an insurance policy with the goal of
recognizing pecumary gam m the state of Idaho,
jurisdiction under Idaho Code section 5-514.
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IS

sufficient for this Court to exercise

B. The Effects of Mr. Whiting's Negligent Advice Were Felt in Idaho and this State's
Courts can extend Long Arm Jurisdiction over him.
Idaho's Long Ann Statute further pennits Idaho's Courts to exercise jurisdiction over
defendants who have committed a tort within the state. The statute expressly extends the State
Court's jurisdiction by listing "[t]he commission of a tortious act within this state" as grounds for
extending the State's jurisdiction. I.C. 5-514(b) (2010).
In addition to availing himself of Idaho's jurisdiction by the business he has conducted,
Mr. Whiting has availed himself of Idaho's jurisdiction by committing a tortious act here. Even
though Mr. Whiting committed his tortious act while he was physically present in Hawaii, the
effects of the tortious act can be felt in Idaho and should be characterized as occurring in this
state. See generally, Blimka v. My Web Wholesaler, LLC, 143 Idaho 723, 728 (2007) (holding
that, for the purpose of a personal jurisdiction analysis, an out-of-state defendant was held to
have committed the tortious act without ever stepping foot within the borders of Idaho). While
this case applies specifically to analyzing whether asserting jurisdiction would violate the
defendant's due process, this case and its holding broadly indicate that Idaho Courts do not just
consider the physical location of the involved parties when detennining whether a tort is
committed in Idaho. Id. For personal jurisdiction purposes, it is possible for the tort of an alleged
tortfeasor to be "located" in Idaho without the tortfeasor every stepping foot within the state. Id.
Mr. Whiting's tortious act should be characterized as occurring here because of the longtenn nature of the services he provided to Mr. Gailey and because he held himself out as an
Idaho businessman even after leaving for Hawaii. Between 1994 and 2011, Mr. Whiting serviced
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Mr. Gailey's insurance policy. When Mr. Gailey left to move to Hawaii in May of 2011, Mr.
Whiting's business interests were still centered around Boise, Idaho. Mr. Whiting continued to
conduct business from Hawaii as if he were in Boise, Idaho. Mr. Whiting still appeared as the
representative on Western Reserve Life's insurance policy, listing has address as being in Boise.
Furthermore, Mr. Whiting continued to operate a business in Boise from his new home in
Hawaii.
When Mr. Whiting engaged in professional malpractice by giving Mr. Gailey bad advice,
Mr. Whiting's business was still in Idaho. While he may have physically moved, his business
and his business persona were still in Boise, Idaho. When Mr. Gailey called for advice in August
of2011, he believed that he was conducting business with an Idaho based insurer.
Because Mr. Whiting's business interests were still centered around Boise, Idaho and
because he held himself out as a businessman in Idaho, his tortious actions should be considered
as occurring in this state.
C. Mr. Whiting has Sufficient Contacts with the State of Idaho to Permit the State to
Exercise Jurisdiction over Mr. Whiting without Violating Principles of Due Process.
Due process requires that a defendant 1) have certain minimum contacts with the forum
and 2) that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice." Int'I Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (U.S. 1945). Essentially the
analysis defined by the United States Supreme Court is to ascertain whether the defendant can
expect to be brought before a state's court.
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Sufficient minimum contact exists where a defendant purposefully directs his activities at
residents of the forum state and the litigation relates to those activities. Houghland Farms v.

Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 76 (Idaho 1990).

The question of whether assertion of personal

jurisdiction comports with fair play and substantial justice involves many factors, but, as this
Court recognized in Houghland, the essential inquiry is whether "the defendant purposefully
avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum State, thus invoking the benefits
and protections of its laws." Id. at 72, 803 P.2d at 986 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 347 U.S.
235, 253 (1958)). Moreover, "where a defendant who purposefully directed his activities at
forum residents seeks to defeat jurisdiction, he must present a compelling case that the presence
of some other considerations would render jurisdiction unjustifiable." Id. at 76, 803 P.2d at 982
(quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985)).

International Shoe and its federal and state progeny focus on the extent that non-present
entities may reach into a forum state before being subject to personal jurisdiction. They do not
stand for the proposition that a post-present defendant may escape liability by running for the
border.
Similarly, it is in keeping with-not in excess of-the traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice to expect a businessman to be accountable for his business in the forum where
that business resided. Mr. Whiting availed himself of the privileges of the state specifically by
maintaining the center of his business practices in Idaho after leaving for Hawaii and by
engaging with Mr. Gailey as ifhe still resided in Idaho.
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In 2011, Mr. Whiting operated a business in the state ofIdaho remotely from Hawaii. Mr.
Whiting had several Idaho business addresses associated with him in Idaho even after he left.
Furthermore, Mr. Whiting and his Boise office space continued to be listed on correspondence
that Mr. Gailey received from Western Reserve Life Insurance. When Mr. Gailey sought Mr.
Whiting's advice, Mr. Gailed called a two-zero-eight number and fully believed that he was
speaking with an insurance agent residing in Idaho. Mr. Whiting neither provided Mr. Gailey
with information on his move nor in formation on the termination of his insurance license.
Because Mr. Whiting continued to operate his business in Idaho and because Mr. Whiting held
himself out as a an Idaho business man during this period of time, it comports with fair play and
substantial justice to allow Idaho Court's to have jurisdiction over him.
Furthermore, it is against wise public policy to permit an Idaho businessman to avoid
Idaho's personal jurisdiction by skipping town. While Mr. Gailey does not allege that Mr.
Whiting left town specifically to avoid this law suit, if the lower court's ruling is affirmed, the
result of such a ruling is that an Idaho businessman in an ongoing business relationship with a
client may avoid the jurisdiction of this Court simply by moving to another state. To borrow a
phrase, such a result would substantially interfere with fair play and substantial justice.
As it was reasonable for the Mr. Whiting to sue and be sued during his lengthy personal
residence in Idaho, it is reasonable for him to expect the same when potential liability arises from
his ongoing business transactions in the state.
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v.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss should not have been
granted. The District Court's decision must be reversed. Finally, this action should be remanded
with instruction to continue this action for trial.
/

Respectfully submitted this

I::' day of March, 2014
<7'

MART~L~TON

AND ASSOCIATES, P.A.

(V/}it/LA/
Martin J. Martelle
Attorney for the PlaintifflAppellant
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